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ABSTRACT
According to the data collected from 2013, impostor email attack/threads/scam has
siphoned more than $2.3 billion from more than 17,000 victims. Impostor email attacks succeed
as they look and feel legitimate, they do not include malicious link or malware attachments, and
they do not arrive in high enough volumes to raise red flags in most anti-spam tools. Hence,
impostor emails can evade solutions that look for only malicious content or behaviour. Detection
of these emails is a major challenge for email security providers as well as difficult to recognise
these emails by the end user (when sent from look-alike domains, having valid Sender Policy
Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), Domain-based Message Authentication,
Reporting & Conformance (DMARC) records). There are techniques which uses methods such as
dynamically analysing the attributes of all emails as it arrives and detect anomalies that point to
an impostor, but they are not fool proof. The technique presented herein propose method to use
remote attestation for providing trustworthiness to the emails exchanged between sender and
recipient, hence preventing impostor attacks/frauds.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION
According to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Canter (IC3), impostor email
attacks/threats/scam has siphoned more than $2.3 billion from more than 17,000 victims, after they
started tracking these types of scams from 2013 (and these are just reported incidents). Many
messages will be quickly recognised by recipients as phishing and discarded, but the small few
that succeed can yield millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers. Impostor email attacks succeed
as,
·
They look and feel legitimate.
·
They do not include a malicious link or malware attachments.
·
They do not arrive in high enough volumes to raise red flags in most anti-spam tools.
Impostor emails have grown to target companies both large and small in every part of the world.
They constitute for mainly two types of frauds:
• Supply Chain Fraud (when an attacker can take over the legitimate email account of a
trusted third-party supplier, they can get a big return without ever interacting with a C-level
executive).
• CEO fraud (also known as business email fraud).
Here is a small sampling of recent impostor attacks during the last few years:
• A Hong Kong subsidiary at Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. discovered that it had made more than $45
million in payments over an extended period to attackers using impostor emails to pose as a
supplier.
• Crelan, a Belgian bank recently lost more than $70 million due to impostor emails, discovering
the fraud only after the company conducted an internal audit.
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• In New Zealand, a higher education provider, TWoA, lost more than $100,000 when their CFO
fell victim to an impostor email, believing the payment request came from the organization's
president.
• Luminant Corp., an electric utility company in Dallas, Texas sent a little over $98,000 in response
to an email request that they thought was coming from a company executive. Later it was learned
that attackers sent an impostor email from a domain name with just two letters transposed.
As these threats do not use malicious attachments or URLs, impostor emails can evade
solutions that look for only malicious content or behaviour. Hence detection of these emails is a
major challenge for email security providers as well as difficult to recognise these emails by the
end user (when sent from look-alike domains, having valid Sender Policy Framework (SPF),
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting &
Conformance (DMARC) records).
There are techniques which uses methods such as dynamically analyzing the attributes of all emails
as it arrives and detect anomalies that point to an impostor, but they are not fool proof.
Following are few types of impostor email threats:
• Spoofed Name: The name of the spoofed executive in the "From" field. But the email
address is an outside email account that belongs to the attacker. This is around 21%.
• Reply-To Spoofing: The "From" name, address field and reply-to name are the real ones
of the executive being impersonated. But the "Reply-to" address is that of imposter’s. This
is around 75%.
• Spoofed Sender (with no reply-to address): The impostor email uses the name and email
address of the spoofed executive. But the email does not contain a "Reply-to" address. This
is around 2%.
• Lookalike Domain: The attacker’s "From" address is close enough in appearance to the
impersonated executive's to fool busy recipients. This is around 2%.
Detection of such impostor emails is a challenge for email security providers, as these emails
does not contain malware, may not contain attachments and no hyper-links. These are low in
volume, targeted to specific user and hand crafted, hence it is very difficult to detect. There are
authentication methods such as DMARC, SPF and DKIM can prevent domain spoofing, but
authentication can be difficult and may end up blocking legitimate email.
The technique presented herein propose method to use remote attestation for providing
trustworthiness to the emails exchanged between sender and recipient, hence preventing impostor
attacks/frauds.
Few Definitions:
• Sender/Recipient: The sender or recipient can be an email client, Secure Email Gateway
(SEG), Mailbox Connectors (MC) (or mailbox solutions).
• Remote Attester: Remote attester is responsible for establishing trust between sender and
recipient by generating unique attestation token for every email at the sender side and
validating the attestation token at the recipient side. The recipient of an impostor attacks
always receives mails from impostor (spoofed trusted users) i.e., users from the same
organisation or trusted organisation or partner organisation). Hence remote attester can be
deployed in an organization enterprise network or on cloud or service offered by multitenant service provider.
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As per this method, remote attester is used to generate attestation token for each email using
metadata (email header) sent by the Sender and later it would be validated by the recipient.
Figure-1 describe remote attestation method for enhancing email security.

Figure-1
The technique presented herein is explained with the following steps:
• Mail clients or Secure Email Gateway or Mailbox Connector (both sender and recipient)
registers with the remote attester.
• Sender sends mail header (metadata) of every email to the remote attester before sending
to the recipient.
• Remote attester generates attestation token using metadata for every email.
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Remote attester returns the attestation token to the sender.
Sender includes the attestation token in the email headers.
Sender sends the email to the recipient.
Upon receiving the email, it sends the mail header (metadata) along with attestation token
to the remote attester.
Remote attester validates the attestation token against the metadata.
Remote attester returns 'whether sender is trustworthy or not' to the recipient.

If the recipient is a Secure Email Gateway or Mailbox Connector, then the un-trusted mail will
be dropped and not delivered to the end user (based on the configurable policy). If the recipient is
a mail client, then the mail is not presented to the mail until it gets the response from the remote
attester. Upon getting the response from the remote attester, action is taken to drop or present the
email to the mail client (based on the configurable policy).
The technique presented herein uses simple remote attestation method to prevent impostor
attacks/frauds to enhance email security with respect to supply chain and CEO frauds. As per this
method, remote attester generates attestation token for each email using metadata (email header)
and validates that email sender is trustworthy or not.
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